

sentience, and neither is capable of putting sentience into words entirely within its own idiom. Therefore it's also entirely unjustified for Münsterberg to believe that causal psychology departs further from reality than intentional psychology and could therefore appear superfluous from the theoretical standpoint.¹⁸⁴ The task of causal psychology is just as precisely indicated by the structure of sentience as the task of intentional psychology is. Indeed, strictly speaking it's *causal* psychology that's *psychology* proper, whereas the complementary discipline would be more correctly designated as a theory of the *mind*. Causal psychology must occupy itself with the exploration of *exhibitible* causal coherences only, whose exposition was the goal of this treatise, and not with the composition of the total life of the soul out of constructed components.¹⁸⁵

to control both infinitives. Thus a typographical or editorial error is to be suspected here.]

184. Münsterberg, *Psychotechnik*, pp. 44 f. With this conception practically the entire earlier foundation of psychology is sacrificed.

185. In the sConcluding Consideration, we'll come back to the question of different "psychological" disciplines, after we have gained further material for it in the second treatise.

Second Treatise

Individual and Community

Introduction

The investigation into sentient causality grasped the lone psyche first of all as a microcosm, as a world unto itself.¹ However, our considerations themselves were pressing toward a broadening of this framework. We saw that the "mechanism" of sentient occurrence isn't self-contained. The lifepower that keeps it in operation undergoes influxes "from without," and you've got to trace those influxes to their sources if you wish to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the individual psyche. So there are two major directions to be pursued: the insertion into the network of material nature, and the insertion [of the lone psyche] into the network of the mental world.² The following investigation is devoted to the second problem.³

Before anything else, if you want to understand in what sense you can talk about a universe of sentient reality into which the lone psyche fits as a member, you've got to clarify a determinate form of the living together of individual persons.⁴ An opposition between two different

1. Not until after the conclusion of this treatise did I come upon the book by Theodor Litt, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft: Grundfragen der sozialen Theorie und Ethik* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1919), whose basic conception touches closely upon what is presented here.

2. [*Zusammenhang*, "network," also means coherence or connection. This term names the lawful principle of organization of these worlds. *Die geistige Welt*, "the mental world," also means the world of culture, value, sentiment, and spirit. In English there is no single noun that captures the sense of *Geist*.]

3. [The insertion of the sensate mechanism into the network of material nature has been dealt with in the first treatise.]

4. [German *Form*, like English "form," comes from Latin *forma*. In philosophy this term designates the design or shape that makes a thing be the kind of thing that it is. In classical philosophy, to understand something was to attain an intellectual grasp of its form. The term will be translated as "mode" in passages where Stein seems not to invoke this philosophical meaning.]

types of "sociation" plays an important role in modern sociology.⁵ Ferdinand Tönnies first worked it out, and it was picked up by others, for example by Max Scheler: I have in mind the opposition between *community* and *association*.⁶ Under "community" is understood the natural, organic union of individuals; under "association" is understood a union that is rational and mechanical. Without getting into the historical emergence of these social formations, and without holding ourselves exactly to the demarcations as they might be found in Tönnies, we can perhaps best render our essential distinction in the following manner. Where one person approaches another as *subject* to *object*, examines her, "deals with" her methodically on the basis of the knowledge obtained, and coaxes the intended reactions out of her, they are living together in an *association*. Conversely where a subject accepts the other as a *subject* and does not confront him but rather *lives with him* and is determined by the stirrings of his life, they are forming a *community* with one another.⁷ In the association, everyone is absolutely alone, a "windowless monad."⁸ In the community, solidarity prevails. It's easy

5. [*Vergesellschaftung*, "sociation," can also mean socialization, association, nationalization, or incorporation. Stein is referring to recent sociological discussions in which distinctions came to be made between *Gemeinschaft*, "community," and *Gesellschaft*, "association." "Association" here means a voluntary connection in the social sphere — a society, a club, corporation, or the like; it has nothing to do with the psychological process of association that Stein discussed in the first treatise. In German these are entirely different words.]

6. [Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) published *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie* in 1887. The term *Gesellschaft*, "association," can also be translated as "society." See *Community & Society = Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, trans. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).]

7. [In the last two sentences, the gender of the pronouns could be either masculine or feminine in English. In German it just so happens that the noun *Person* takes feminine pronouns and the noun *Subjekt* takes masculine pronouns. So "he or she" would be appropriate in either sentence.]

8. [This is a philosophical allusion to the metaphysical theory of monads, developed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in a 1714 manuscript. A monad is a simple substance containing within itself all that it will ever be or know. It cannot trade influences with other monads, for as a *simple* substance it has no parts, hence "no windows" through which it could receive or send messages. As popularly understood, this means that we as

to see that factual personal alliances are mostly mixed forms of these basic types, but that in principle, an association that would be *only* an association, and not to a certain extent *also* a community, would be inconceivable.⁹

Let's take a demagogue as the purest example possible of an "association man" who wants to make a crowd of people subservient for his own purposes. The bond of solidarity is severed between him and those who are the object of his "treatment." He observes them like a sailor watching wind and waves that he's got to reckon with, or like a toreador watching a bull whose weak spot he wants to hit. And his whole deportment is methodically attuned to the effects that he wishes to exert, in contrast to the "community man," who behaves himself "ingenuously," without calculating the effects of his demeanor, and artlessly receives impressions without initiating surveillance. However, because subjectivity is the object of the association man, he needs the posture of the community man as an epistemological expedient. Because in order to come as close to someone else's inwardness as is necessary for his purpose, you've got to be able to give yourself over to it. You can't make the subject into an object without having first having accepted it once simply as a subject. You can't be familiar with the method for making an impression upon the crowd if you lack the kind of intimacy with their inner life that's achieved only in artless yielding [to it]. What distinguishes the observer from the spontaneous participant is this: The observer rationally takes advantage of what community life offers him. He passes over from spontaneous experiencing into a wary posture, he makes everybody else's inwardness into an object instead of immediately "reacting" to it, and he exploits the knowledge [of it] for the purposes of his transactions.¹⁰

monads cannot really communicate. On a more subtle level, however, it means that we can communicate *only that* which we already have available within our own beings, for each human monad already has all others internal to itself. Stein's theory of empathy is consistent with this more subtle understanding of Leibniz's metaphysics.]

9. See below, part II, §4c. It was also stressed by Max Scheler that association is based on community.

10. [This passage, written about 1919, is among those that (whether rightly or wrongly) have earned Stein the reputation of having prophetically foreseen the process through which National Socialists would achieve political power in Germany. Ironically, while Nazi ideology was talking the talk of organic natural bonding through blood and soil, which

types of "sociation" plays an important role in modern sociology.⁵ Ferdinand Tönnies first worked it out, and it was picked up by others, for example by Max Scheler: I have in mind the opposition between *community* and *association*.⁶ Under "community" is understood the natural, organic union of individuals; under "association" is understood a union that is rational and mechanical. Without getting into the historical emergence of these social formations, and without holding ourselves exactly to the demarcations as they might be found in Tönnies, we can perhaps best render our essential distinction in the following manner. Where one person approaches another as *subject* to *object*, examines her, "deals with" her methodically on the basis of the knowledge obtained, and coaxes the intended reactions out of her, they are living together in an *association*. Conversely where a subject accepts the other as a *subject* and does not confront him but rather *lives with him* and is determined by the stirrings of his life, they are forming a *community* with one another.⁷ In the association, everyone is absolutely alone, a "windowless monad."⁸ In the community, solidarity prevails. It's easy

5. [*Vergesellschaftung*, "sociation," can also mean socialization, association, nationalization, or incorporation. Stein is referring to recent sociological discussions in which distinctions came to be made between *Gemeinschaft*, "community," and *Gesellschaft*, "association." "Association" here means a voluntary connection in the social sphere – a society, a club, corporation, or the like; it has nothing to do with the psychological process of association that Stein discussed in the first treatise. In German these are entirely different words.]

6. [Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) published *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie* in 1887. The term *Gesellschaft*, "association," can also be translated as "society." See *Community & Society = Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, trans. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).]

7. [In the last two sentences, the gender of the pronouns could be either masculine or feminine in English. In German it just so happens that the noun *Person* takes feminine pronouns and the noun *Subjekt* takes masculine pronouns. So "he or she" would be appropriate in either sentence.]

8. [This is a philosophical allusion to the metaphysical theory of monads, developed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in a 1714 manuscript. A monad is a simple substance containing within itself all that it will ever be or know. It cannot trade influences with other monads, for as a *simple* substance it has no parts, hence "no windows" through which it could receive or send messages. As popularly understood, this means that we as

to see that factual personal alliances are mostly mixed forms of these basic types, but that in principle, an association that would be *only* an association, and not to a certain extent *also* a community, would be inconceivable.⁹

Let's take a demagogue as the purest example possible of an "association man" who wants to make a crowd of people subservient for his own purposes. The bond of solidarity is severed between him and those who are the object of his "treatment." He observes them like a sailor watching wind and waves that he's got to reckon with, or like a toreador watching a bull whose weak spot he wants to hit. And his whole deportment is methodically attuned to the effects that he wishes to exert, in contrast to the "community man," who behaves himself "ingenuously," without calculating the effects of his demeanor, and artlessly receives impressions without initiating surveillance. However, because subjectivity is the object of the association man, he needs the posture of the community man as an epistemological expedient. Because in order to come as close to someone else's inwardness as is necessary for his purpose, you've got to be able to give yourself over to it. You can't make the subject into an object without having first having accepted it once simply as a subject. You can't be familiar with the method for making an impression upon the crowd if you lack the kind of intimacy with their inner life that's achieved only in artless yielding [to it]. What distinguishes the observer from the spontaneous participant is this: The observer rationally takes advantage of what community life offers him. He passes over from spontaneous experiencing into a wary posture, he makes everybody else's inwardness into an object instead of immediately "reacting" to it, and he exploits the knowledge [of it] for the purposes of his transactions.¹⁰

monads cannot really communicate. On a more subtle level, however, it means that we can communicate *only that* which we already have available within our own beings, for each human monad already has all others internal to itself. Stein's theory of empathy is consistent with this more subtle understanding of Leibniz's metaphysics.]

9. See below, part II, §4c. It was also stressed by Max Scheler that association is based on community.

10. [This passage, written about 1919, is among those that (whether rightly or wrongly) have earned Stein the reputation of having prophetically foreseen the process through which National Socialists would achieve political power in Germany. Ironically, while Nazi ideology was talking the talk of organic natural bonding through blood and soil, which

Now if, as a counterpart to the demagogue, we take the genuine "man of the people" who puts himself at the service of the people out of a natural predisposition, then we see that he frequently will be relying upon the associational approach as a method for the purposes of the community. Certainly what counts for him are the wishes, needs, and interests of the people, which he allows to affect him directly as a community man. Certainly the "impression" that he makes, and which confers upon him the position of leader, is unintentional. But once he becomes conscious of his function as head of the community, then he also is put into the position of having to study the people in order to be able to guide them correctly. Still, it's possible for him to fulfill his task without bringing that position clearly to givenness¹¹ and without passing over into the associational posture. Thus community is possible without association, but not association without community.

The following investigation attempts to get to the bottom of the question of how it's possible to have a community as a higher-level subject and a community life.¹²

is characteristic of community, Stein's analysis indicates that Nazi practices exemplified the disingenuous rhetoric of "association men and women." Grammatically, of course, the pronouns need not be masculine in English. *Gesellschaftsmensch* means "association human being." *Mensch* often is translated as "person," but that term cannot be used here because Stein reserves *Person* for a particular dimension of human being.]

11. [The phenomenologists used the technical expression "givenness" to characterize the direct availability of certain facts to intuition. It is related to the term "data" (literally, "givens"), and to the German idiom *es gibt* (literally, "it gives"), which translates "there is."]

12. [This notion of a "higher-level" or "super-individual" subject invokes a familiar philosophical analogy: that society is like a big person. Medieval and early modern political theorists regarded the monarch as the personification of the country. Thomas Hobbes's classic work *Leviathan* (1651) criticized that notion, and argued instead that the person of the state was formed as an aggregate of all the individuals choosing to be part of it. Stein now will focus the issue more sharply by asking how far this analogy may be carried. That is, given the complex structures of personal decision-making that she has just laid out in the first treatise, which of these structures are represented as well in the "higher-level" subject? If the community is (or, is like) a big person, then do associational structures perhaps take the place of inclinations and resolves? Stein's former teacher, Edmund Husserl, would also pursue these questions in his writings of the 1920s (cf. Husserl's *Kaizo* essays, Hua 27: 3-124), but Stein was the first to publish a systematic treatment of them.]

I. The Experiential Current of the Community

§1. The Composition of Communal Experiences

The individual ego is the ultimate point of emanation for all living consciousness. "Individual ego" here doesn't mean one person of a specified character or characteristics, but first of all only the ego that is *this one* and no other, solitary and undivided – just as it is experienced, as a radiation point of any experiences at all. It is removed from everything not-I, and from inanimate objects as well as from other subjects, to be sure. And it's distinguished from those other subjects without regard to its proper qualities and theirs. Precisely this ego, which requires no material property in order to demarcate itself off from all others in its egoic being,¹³ is what we designate as a *pure ego*. Continuously arising from the pure ego is an active living of consciousness that, inasmuch as it is moving into the past, is turning itself into "lived life" amalgamated to the unity of the constituted current of consciousness. All the while, the actively constituting life is steadily flowing forth out of what's past, and the constituted current is always in congruence with the formerly actively constituting current. What flows out of *one* ego belongs to *one* current of consciousness, which is isolated unto itself and walled off from every other, just like the ego is.

Now it's quite extraordinary how this ego, notwithstanding its solitariness and inalienable aloneness, can enter into a *community of life* with other subjects, how the individual subject becomes a member of a super-individual subject, and also how a super-individual current of experience is constituted in the active living of such a community-subject or community's subject. How the other subjects are given for the one subject, and the extent to which such givenness is a presupposition for the life of community, are issues that we don't wish to investigate

13. [In other words, the individuality of an ego is not owing to its having an individual material body. Stein here seems to be following the account of the pure ego given in §22 of Book Two of Husserl's *Ideas*. The contrast between §22 and §§34, 49-51 of that book – the contrast between a pure ego and a personal ego – is addressed by Stein in the following paragraphs. For Stein's mature metaphysical theory of individuation, see her *Endliches und Ewiges Sein*, ESW 2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1950), chapter 8, "Sinn und Begründung des Einzelseins."]

here. We are interested mainly in the composition of this community life itself.

Let's start out with the life of any social group at all that we belong to or that we suppose ourselves to be members of. As we pose our questions, we won't be investigating the objective being of the social formation as it confronts us in the world; rather, we want to consider it from inside, as it were. The material that awaits our dissection is whatever we experience as members of the community. Suppose we take the following as an example. The army unit in which I'm serving is grieving over the loss of its leader. If we compare with that the grief that I feel over the loss of a personal friend, then we see that the two cases differ in several respects: (1) the subject of the experiencing is different; (2) there's another composition to the *experience*; (3) there's a different kind of experiential *current* that the experience fits into.

As to the first point, in place of the individual ego we've got a subject in our case that encompasses a plurality of individual egos. Certainly I the individual ego am filled up with grief. But I feel myself to be not alone with it. Rather, I feel it as *our* grief. The experience is essentially colored by the fact that others are taking part in it, or even more, by the fact that I take part in it only as a member of a community. *We* are affected by the loss, and *we* grieve over it. And this "we" embraces not only all those who feel the grief as I do, but all those who are included in the unity of the group: even the ones who perhaps do not know of the event, and even the members of the group who lived earlier or will live later. We, the we who feel the grief, do it in the name¹⁴ of the total group and of all who belong to it. We feel this subject affected within ourselves when we have an experience of community. I grieve as a member of the unit, and the unit grieves within me.

To avoid misunderstanding, perhaps we ought to anticipate here something that won't be clearly established until later investigations. The subject of the community that we're talking about is not to be conceived as a "pure ego" like the individual subject. The experience of the community doesn't arise for the subject of the community in the same manner in which the individual experience arises for the individual ego, which is characterized in its egohood as precisely such an ultimate place of origin. Ultimately the experiences of the community, like

14. This "in the name" designates no "representative body," but merely the relation to the community that is contained in the experience itself.

individual experiences, have their source in the individual egos that belong to the community. However, this impossibility of any "pure ego of the community" doesn't stand in contradiction to our remarks about the subject of the community. The expressions "ego" and "subject" are rather ambiguous. Just as we've got to distinguish the pure ego, that is, the quality-less point of radiation of the experiences, from the *personality*, the constituted unity of personal properties, so too it is with the group. A community-subject, as analog of the pure ego, does not exist. But corresponding to the individual personality, which is constituted in the individual experiences and out of which in turn the individual experiences are to be understood, there could very well be a *collective personality* as that whose experiences the communal experiences are to be regarded as. The closer investigation of these relations must be reserved for a later place.¹⁵

Now we were saying that it's not only the subject but also the experience [of the community] which exhibits a composition different from the individual. In order to show this, we've got to tie it in with the arrangement of experiences that we worked out earlier. We differentiate the *content* of experience (in our case, the grief) from its *being experienced* (the feeling of the grief), and from them in turn [we differentiate] the *consciousness* of the experiencing that accompanies it – without making it objective – and that can accordingly pass over into a reflection that makes the experience into an object. In regard to the content, we've got to separate that which the individual experiences as a member of the community¹⁶ from that which the community itself experiences. The grief that I feel "in the name" of my unit is an individual content as such, saturated by my individual life, even though the circumstance that I'm experiencing it in the name of the unit imparts to it a feature that sets it apart from any purely personal loss.

Thus everyone has grief that's individually *his or hers*; even though it's legitimate to say, on the other hand, that they all feel "the same" grief. This "selfsameness" has significance that merits precise exposition. The grief is quite a private content that I feel, but it is *not only* that. It has a *sense*, and by virtue of that sense it claims to count for something lying beyond the private experiencing, something subsisting objectively,

15. See the part II of this treatise.

16. Not to be confused with how the individual might be stricken *personally* by what happens to the unit: for example, if the leader is his friend.

through which it is rationally substantiated.¹⁷ In our case, the objective item to which the grief applies according to its sense is the loss of the leader. Thus the correlate of the experience is the same for everyone who participates in it. And correspondingly, the sense-content of each of the individual experiences applying to this correlate is *idealiter* the same, notwithstanding the private veneer that encloses it at any given time. Therefore in every experiential content we have to distinguish a core sense from the particular sheath it takes on in the experiencing of this or that ego.

Not every sense need be available to a plurality of subjects. If I lose a friend, this loss affects me like no other human being. And accordingly, the sense-content of the grief that's appropriate to this loss accrues to my experience and only to mine. The sense is available for appreciative empathizing and sympathizing – perhaps it can even be felt more adequately in those ways than by the bereaved person himself or herself. However, in comparison with the originally experienced sense-content, the empathized grief as such, even though the sense is fully received into it, still exhibits a modification of sense that permits you to designate the sense itself, disregarding its experiential coloring as a private experience. Conversely, the sense of the grief that applies to the unit's loss can be experienced, in principle, by any member. An experience of this sense content is required of the unit as such and of everyone that belongs to it. What constitutes the grief as an experiential content of the community, is that which is now realized and intended within the experiences of the solitary members by this rationally required grief. An experiential content coalesces out of multiple components; there's nothing new in it, compared to the individual experience. Moreover, it isn't something instantaneous. It develops in a continuity of experiencing during an interval and shows all sorts of qualitative fluctuations within its unity. The experiential content here belongs only to *one* individual current of consciousness, whereas a whole series of currents of consciousness contributes to its coalescence.

If none of the members feels the appropriate grief, then you've got to say that the loss isn't correctly appreciated by the unit. If even *one*

17. [For the phenomenologists, the *Sinn* or "sense" was that which was known. When two people are perceiving some item, there are two acts of perception, two experiences of perceiving, but only one shared sense. The sense of the item is what's cognitively available to whoever may happen upon it.]

member has realized within himself the rationally required sense-content, then that no longer holds: there the one is feeling "in the name of the unit," and in him the unit has satisfied the claim placed upon it. The experiences of the others aren't eliminated by this. They all share in the assembling of the communal experience; but that which was *intended* in all of them came to *fulfillment* in the experience of this one alone.¹⁸

Furthermore, the relationship of the different partial contents is illuminated by the parallel coalescence of one individual experience – this time we're taking the example from another field. If I come close to an object in the dark and, while steadily keeping it in view, I at first take it to be a crouching man, then an animal, but at last I recognize that it's a milestone, then this altogether continuous experiential series merges into the unity of one perception. The sensory material upon which the experience coalesces, the contents of sensation, are steadily changing; and the objective intention or the "meaning" of the experience changes along with them. The new apprehension cancels out the old, and in a certain manner it voids the sensory data upon which it was coalescing. In the end, the only contents of sensation left standing are those which support the *fulfilled intention* that we possess in transparent recognition. But even the "voided" data aren't deleted from the total experience of perception; rather, they share in its coalescing, just like the others. It works analogously with our case [of the army unit]. The experience of any solitary grieving member has a sense-content, and by virtue of that sense-content it's aiming toward something objective – the loss for which the grief is appropriate. But only in the experience of the one who feels the "appropriate" grief is the intention which runs throughout the collective experience of the community fulfilled and satisfied.

It's got to be stressed that besides the purely objective intention, an intention toward the communal experience is inherent within the experiences that are directed toward a super-individual object – inasmuch as that object is standing before us as super-individual – and that our experience is constitutive for that object. We feel the grief as something belonging to the unit, and in the fact that we're doing that, through this grief we're calling for the grief of the unit to be realized. This intention,

18. [While Stein includes no hint of any theological application, this passage accords with the theology of the prophet Isaiah (see the "Servant Songs" in chapters 42, 49, 50, and 52-3 of the Book of Isaiah) and with Christian appropriations of those biblical texts in theories of substitutionary satisfaction for sin.]

too, can be more or less fulfilled; but this relationship of fulfillment is to be kept thoroughly separate from that mentioned earlier. The intention to realize the communal experience can be fulfilled much more extensively than the intention to do justice to the entitlement of the object – perhaps in cases where the content of the communal experience falls considerably short of that which is required of it. On the other hand, the content of the individual experience can quite nearly approximate what is required by the super-individual object, and yet by no means does it need to coincide with the content of the communal experience. This can be because, along with the content of the communal experience, sense-components are included that are not objectively required. For example, the event in question – the death of the leader – can be falsely evaluated by single members as to its significance for the community. Those “false” sense-contents, canceled and corrected by others, combine into the collective content without any need that the sense-content of the solitary experience be transformed too.

But besides that, still other moments play a role in the divergence of the solitary content from the collective content that’s intended within it. The uninterrupted intention toward the super-individual object that pervades the sense-content of the solitary experience provides the basis for the unity of the communal experience – it’s a unity of sense. Nevertheless the content of the communal experience also has its “experiential coloring,” which surrounds the core sense and which is determined in its peculiarity by the distinctiveness of the private experiential contents that share in the coalescence of the communal experience. Of course the communal experience that coalesces from such diverse single experiences is no less unique in its experiential coloring than the private experiences are, and is different from any of them.

Now we come to the second moment of the concrete experience, the experiencing of content; in our case, the feeling of the grief. The same content (according to its sense-composition) can be felt more or less vehemently; more or less deeply; purely, or adulterated with something else. Every individual feels the content in another manner, and this difference of feeling, the “noetic” difference, has its correlate in the “noematic,” namely, in those diverse “experiential colorings” of the sense-contents of which we spoke. But as to its subsistence, the experiencing isn’t merely private. Just as the sense-content is clothed

by an experiential coloring, so on the other side is the experiencing co-determined by the sense of the content. According to its sense, each content demands an experiencing of an entirely determined kind. Grief, for example the grief appropriate to the loss suffered, calls for a specific depth and a specific vehemence of sentiment. In principle these qualities of feeling can be present with all concerned. But it’s also possible for them to be attained only by a few or by nobody; no one satisfies the demands of the sense-content with his or her experiencing. If we assume that the requisite qualities of experiencing are found with several individuals, and if furthermore we disregard how each one is *personally* affected somehow by the loss, but consider only how they feel as members of the community, then despite everything that they have in common we still find on each of these experiences a private mark.

Now we ask whether we should grant an experiencing as well as an experiential content to the community itself – not only to its members – and we’ve got to say an unconditional yes. If we leave out of consideration how the loss happens to affect us personally, and if we consider only what it means for the community, then we feel in the name of the community, and it’s the community’s experiencing that is carried out in us and through us. It makes perfect sense to say that the community is grieving deeply, passionately, and persistently; or, mildly and fleetingly. With that, the communal experience is constituted on its noetic side just as on its noematic side by the single experiences of the individuals involved. Depending on whether single subjects turn up or not whose experience satisfies the demands of the content, you can say of the community itself that it feels or doesn’t feel the appropriate grief. And in that regard, the private mark of the constitutive single experiences determines the special noetic particularity of communal experiences.

Now what about the consciousness of the community? Can you say that a community is conscious of its experiencing as it happens, that it can perhaps reflect upon its experiencing? And are consciousness and reflection of the community to be distinguished from those of its single members, as we had to distinguish experiencing and experiential content of the community from those of its components? Obviously that won’t work. The community becomes conscious of itself only in us. And this “communal consciousness” of ours doesn’t constitute any super-individual communal consciousness, as private experiencing and its content constitute a super-individual experiencing and a super-individual content. The

individual lives, feels, and acts as a member of the community, and insofar as he does that, the community lives, feels, and acts in him and through him. But when he becomes conscious of his experiencing or reflects upon it, then the community does not become conscious of what it experiences, but rather he becomes conscious of that which the community experiences in him.¹⁹

That brings us back to the thesis with which we began our exposition: All conscious life arises from the individual ego. All originally creative life, the ultimately constitutive flow, has its origin in the individual ego. Solitary experiences and communal experiences diverge only within the realm of constituted experiences. The constitutive flow alone is originally accompanied by consciousness; yet everything constituted only secondarily, as inseparable from that which is constituting, is bathed in the light of consciousness. That's why there can't be any self-supporting communal consciousness, any more than there's a communal life that constitutes.

Accordingly, we won't be allowed to talk about any "consciousness" of the community in the strict sense. With the individual ego we didn't distinguish between a current of consciousness and a current of experience, because here the originally productive flow of experiencing and the series of persistent experiences that is constituted within it as a unity came into congruence, and because the term consciousness in the usual manner of speaking extended from the moment of the experience that we so designate to the overall experience.²⁰ But with communal experience, we've got to distinguish strictly: here there's no current of consciousness as an originally constitutive flow. Yet the experiences of the community combine into a unity, just like those of the individual, so that we can justifiably talk about one *experiential current of the community*.

We've got to consider this formation somewhat more closely now. To begin with, it differs from the experiential current of an individual through the fact that, as to its constitution, it refers back to the original conscious life of a plurality of single subjects. Regardless of that, however, there exists a difference between the components out of which the one

19. That isn't changed by the fact that we might attribute to a community (perhaps to a people in a later era of their development) an especially high degree of "consciousness." This consciousness, then, signifies a typical characteristic of the members of the community (that is, of their experiencing) but not of the community itself.

20. Here we're entirely disregarding other meanings of the word.

and the other unity coalesces [respectively]. Communal experiences, as we saw, are constituted by solitary experiences both as to their content and as to their being experienced. The communal experience and the total current don't simply *permeate* the experiential current of the individuals involved, so that the same experience would be regarded as a component of [both] the solitary experiential streams and the communal experiential stream. On the contrary, what the individual experiences as a member of the community forms the material out of which the communal experiences coalesce. Thus they belong in a higher level of constitution than the solitary experiences.²¹ This difference already comes to expression purely superficially in the fact that the experiences of a community itself can extend over a much greater duration than those of an individual. The hatred of the Guelfs for the Ghibellines or the animosity of social democracy toward the "bourgeois society" are unitary experiences in the experiential current of the party concerned, and they extend over an entire generation of individuals who at any given time are furnishing constitutive contributions to the coalescence of the higher-order enduring unity.

The considerations of Simmel concerning historical occurrence are very instructive for comprehension of this enduring unity and its position in the experiential current of the community.²² The real occurrence, he says, is continuous, but the historical occurrence does not coincide with it. Rather, historical occurrence consists in discrete events that are collected under one unified idea (battle, war, reign, and the like). If you dissect these unities further and further, you finally come to "atoms" that no longer have any historical sense and out of which the historical no longer can coalesce.

21. The same experience can perhaps come under consideration as a solitary experience and a communal experience – and as to its *sense*-content, surely; as to the *experiencing*, every communal experience is simultaneously a solitary experience – and it can be considered sometimes with reference to this aspect and sometimes under another. For example, I experienced the outbreak of war as a rupture of my personal life course and simultaneously as our common fate. These intentions of different kinds are woven together and are built upon one another within the unity of one experience. In the retrospectively consideration, I can focus upon the one without considering the other too.

22. See Georg Simmel, "Das Problem der historischen Zeit," *Philosophische Vorträge* of the Kant Gesellschaft, vol. 12 (Berlin: Ruetter & Reichard, 1916).

We've made clear our view that such considerations technically stand above our posing of the problem. The specifics of the historical are not concerned with the relationship of individual and community, but the exposition of this relationship is presupposed, and Simmel's constructions imply something about it. The opposition of "real" and "historical" occurrence shows that Simmel looks upon the "historical" as a product of historical thinking, a product that is elaborated from the material of the "real" occurrence through a certain "molding." For example, the experiences of the single soldiers in a battle belong to what Simmel designates as "atoms" and reckons to be the material of historical occurrence. Rightly considered, these are already discrete unities that stand out from the original continuum, the constituting current of experience. In their totality, these experiential unities form the constituted (individual) current of experience that extends itself in the unity of immanent time,²³ and they fill various duration spans of that time.

Among the immanent unities there exist certain connections. The later unities are dependent upon the earlier ones in their arising and in their quality. Every such unity at once forms a portion of the current, and besides that can be of significance for the filling out of later spans of the current; thus it participates in the coalescence of the current in a twofold sense. But this second constitutive significance isn't identical for all immanent unities. They are more or less "momentous" and consequently more or less responsible for the composition of the total current; thus they are constitutive factors of various valence. If we designate as the "history" of a person the progress of her life, that is, her experiences inasmuch as they stay within the precisely narrated inner coherence, together with her motives and the development of her personality going hand in hand with the course of experience, then we see that not all experiences in the current within which this "history" coalesces are of "historic" significance. Strictly speaking, the life-coherence of an individual is an historic occurrence not when considered in isolation, but rather insofar as it fits into the total coherence of historical life. Yet it shows us in miniature the composition of historical

23. [*Immanente Zeit*, "immanent time," is the subject's experience of the sequence of experiences. An "immanent unity" is the subject's experience of the wholeness and completeness of the sense of one of its objects. "Immanent" means available through intuition, rather than through the steps of reasoning.]

occurrence.²⁴ The inwardly cohering progress of a life is no less "real" than the collective current from which it is lifted forth, and the discrete unities that comprise the current are no less real than the original living. The unities of sense lie ready for the contemplating and comprehending glance, and are not imported into the "original reality" for the first time by any remodeling activity.

Now experiential constitution doesn't stop short with the individual experiences. Rather, the communal experiences coalesce out of the individual experiential unities and on account of them. Even so, it's apparent that not all individual experiences contribute to the composition of the super-individual experiences, and furthermore, that not everything that transpires in the life of a community needs to fall in line with the coherence of the progress of its life. [The communal is analogous to the individual in several additional respects.] To the coalescence of the individual experiential current, there corresponds the coalescence of the super-individual experiential current; and to the salience of the "meaningful" inwardly cohering solitary life, there corresponds the sense-coherence of a communal life. Moreover, these higher sense-unities are discoverable realities, not products of historical method. When you look for the components or "atoms" of historical occurrence, it's not the case that the individual experiences you'll come upon will be material for an historical treatment but unhistorical in themselves. Rather, they're eligible for historical treatment only when they play a role in the collective progress of life which historical science is seeking to trace.

Concerning the single communal experiences, it is still to be said that they differ from individual experiences not only as to their duration but also as to the profusion of their content. What an experience like the suffering of a conquered people encompasses is so vast that the lone [human being] stands before it as before something immense and incomprehensible.²⁵ And not only someone who confronts the community

24. What we characterized as the progress of a person's life, and every self-contained sense-coherence of analogous structuration, falls under the concept of "sequence" which Alexandru Xénopol coined in his *Théorie de l'histoire: Des principes fondamentaux de l'histoire* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1908).

25. [Writing just after the Armistice, Stein has in mind the harsh terms imposed upon the defeated German nation. But many have noted that her observations hold prophetic significance for the fate of German and Eastern European Jews some twenty years later.]

as a stranger, but also someone who belongs to it, who has a share in its experience and helps to compose that experience [finds the community's suffering incomprehensible]. Even what [the community member] does feel of this suffering is only a small contribution to the total experience, of which he comprehends some inkling in his suffering but which he is incapable of totally fulfilling.²⁶

But don't lose sight of what was just now revealed of the total experiential current: The relationship of the communal experience to the individual experience is constitution, not summation. If you were capable of compiling within yourself all the coalescing experiences, but you united them as a mere aggregate without inner coherence in themselves, you wouldn't be in possession of the full communal experience, any more than you get the unity of an object by merely stringing together the sensory data. You don't have a new whole instead of an aggregate of components until the multiple contributions, governed by the unity of one sense, have integrated themselves into a structure of a higher kind. So the communal experiences, and the unity of the current into which they integrate themselves, coalesce on account of the single experiences which constitute the unity.

Nevertheless it should not be said that the communal experiences are unavailable in principle for the individual. Whoever wanted to assert that would have to declare every single statement about communal experiences to be non-referential. As we've already brought out, it belongs to the sense of those individual experiences that are constitutive for a communal experience, that they target the communal experience and tend to try to encompass it.²⁷ And we have seen that this tendency can

26. From earlier developments we know that the "unfulfillment" is to be understood in a twofold sense. It is possible that the experience of the single member does not fully comprehend that of the community, but rather encompasses what the others are contributing to it too only in a hollow manner. And further, there exists the possibility that the single community member – just like the whole community, perhaps – doesn't feel the "appropriate" suffering, which means that justified by the matters experienced. The experience of the single member, from which the communal experience coalesces, can be unfulfilled in both ways. But it can also be fulfilled in the one without being so in the other.

27. [*Es zu umspannen streben*, "tend to try to encompass it," reintroduces the technical term that Stein used in the first treatise to signify a special kind of phenomenal coherence: *Strebung*, "inclination." Here she is indicating that individual experiences exhibit an intrinsic

be more or less fulfilled. How this being-encompassed of the communal experience by the individual experience is to be understood, whether there's a limit in principle to the capacity for fulfillment, whether other individual experiences come into consideration as the original coalescents that bring the communal experience to givenness for the individual – all those are questions that require special investigation. We can't get into them at this point.

§2. Components of the Experiential Current

To start with, we ought to investigate *which* individual experiences are suitable for helping to build up a communal experience, because not everything that surfaces in the current of consciousness is useful for this. Experiences with an individual sense, which means experiences that target something that has significance only for the individual alone, remain confined to that individual and play no constitutive role beyond him or her.

a) *Sensuality and sensory intuition*. If we apply this standard, then we find that the lowest layer of the overall life of consciousness, the entire *life of the senses*, is incapable of constituting any communal experience on its own. Sheer sensuality is what every individual as such has for himself or herself alone and shares with no one else. This holds for experiences with extra-egoic content (the sensations) as well as for those with egoic content (like sensory pain). A shimmer "before the eyes," a ringing "in the ear," an itch, a tickle, a purely sensuous pleasurable feeling has no sense extending beyond the subjective state and therefore cannot be experienced commonly by several subjects. This leads us to the remarkable result that the community as such has no sensuality. At first this may sound odd, but rightly understood, it holds nothing surprising. Nevertheless it should not be said that sensuality plays no role in the life of the community. Because sensuality is the basis of individual conscious life, which constitutes the life of the community, ultimately sensuality is also constitutive for the life of the community. Later we'll see, furthermore, that not only the sensuality of single members but also their sensory contact with one another is of the greatest significance for the experiences of the community. Finally, it should

valence toward communal experience, and are attracted toward it, so to speak.]